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Abstract
Background: In this paper we review the relationship between participation in legislative hearings,
the use of ideological arguments, and the strength of public health legislation using a theoretical
construct proposed by E. E. Schattschneider in 1960. Schattschneider argued that the breadth and
types of participation in a political discussion could change political outcomes.
Methods: We test Schattschneider's argument empirically by reviewing the efforts of six states to
pass Clean Indoor Air Acts by coding testimony given before legislators, comparing these findings
to the different characteristics of each state's political process and the ultimate strength of each
state's legislation.
Results: We find that although greater participation is associated with stronger legislation, there
is no clear relationship between the use and type of ideological arguments and eventual outcomes.
Conclusion: These findings offer validation of a long-standing theory about the importance of
political participation, and suggest strategies for public health advocates seeking to establish new
legislation.
Background
This paper considers the question of whether participa-
tion is associated with the passage of public health legis-
lation. To do so, we review workplace smoking legislation
proposed and debated in six different US states, including
the extent of outside participation, which we define for
the purposes of this study as the decision by individuals to
give spoken or written testimony before the legislature in
support of or opposition to a proposed policy change.
Nearly fifty years ago political scientist E. E. Schattschnei-
der (1960)[1] theorized that political outcomes could be
explained by considering the number of participants and
the types of arguments used by advocates for change and
those used by individuals and groups that preferred the
status quo. Given that full societal participation in politics
is rare, Schattschneider believed that groups that benefited
from the status quo, primarily businesses and wealthy
individuals, controlled the political environment. His
claims have been cited repeatedly in studies of political
and legislative behavior, guiding much of the research on
political influence [2-4] and social movements[5,6]
However, the empirical question of whether these
assumptions were correct remains unanswered; this was
never empirically validated in Schattschneider's work, and
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it has not drawn much scholarly attention, possibly
because, as Tversky and Kahneman (1974) noted,
researchers also tend to accept theoretically intuitive
results as proven after only limited study[7] Research in
political science and public health has addressed related
questions; showing, for example, that increased media
attention to an issue leads to more Congressional hear-
ings and increased political participation at the national
level,[8] and also appears to increase policy making activ-
ity (although changes may not be effective)[9] Case stud-
ies of US federal and state government efforts to pass
tobacco control legislation suggest that they succeed or
fail in large part based on the degree to which public
health advocates were engaged in the political process
[10-18] Case studies of similar efforts in other countries
also reveal the importance of participation by health
advocates, but as with all case studies, these results are not
comparative [19-26] Yet despite the existence of such case
studies, which in the US extend to a range of issues, [27-
29] much of the theoretical research in political science on
the use of testimony and expertise in policy making claims
that politicians largely ignore testimony, and instead sup-
port policies that are easy to explain to constituents and as
a result are unlikely to address complicated problems
effectively [30-34] However, recent research suggests such
pessimism is unwarranted,[35,36] and our findings
extend on this work by suggesting specific tactics that may
lead to more socially desirable outcomes.
The question of whether the number of participants and
types of argument predict the outcome of a political
debate is particularly relevant to public health legislation,
which is collective in nature because it seeks to establish
benefits that are available to anyone without restriction. It
is exemplified in efforts to decrease the use of tobacco,
which, as a product responsible for 440,000 deaths a year,
is the leading cause of mortality in the United States[37]
Although tobacco control advocates in the US have fre-
quently been successful on the local level, the tobacco
industry has strong ties to many federal and state legisla-
tors and often forestalls or weakens proposed new legisla-
tion[11,12,38,39] If Schattschneider was correct,
prospective public health legislation is most likely to ben-
efit from outside participation, that is, participation by
non-legislators. Establishing a relationship between out-
comes and participation may be useful for public health
advocates in determining where to focus political effort.
Schattschneider argued that greater participation was
responsible for changing the status quo. However, it is
also possible that increased outside participation may not
cause stronger legislation protecting public health, but is
a necessary condition to its passage. In either case, public
health advocates may find that it is not worth pursuing
legislation without broad public support.
This kind of strategic thinking is particularly relevant in
cases where there is known opposition that benefits from
the status quo. Public health advocacy frequently con-
fronts existing corporate practices,[40] and corporate
behavior is increasingly recognized as a fundamental
cause of disease[41,42] Corporate activity is implicated in
health problems such as obesity, tobacco, alcohol, and
other drug use, as well as in risks posed by automobiles,
guns, and pharmaceuticals[42] Efforts to change health-
damaging corporate behavior are key emerging issues in
public health advocacy. Tobacco control advocacy has
been the leading edge of public health efforts to change
corporate practices that affect public health,[42] and its
successes and failures offer insight for future public health
campaigns. Increasingly, public health researchers are
seen as having an obligation to be involved in policy and
media efforts to improve public health[43] and to deal
with the controversy inherent in questioning the status
quo[44]
In attempting to pass restrictions on smoking, public
health advocates face a highly organized and well-funded
industry that strongly resists regulation[11] However, in
1992, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
released a report on the health effects of secondhand
smoke,[45] which concluded that secondhand smoke was
carcinogenic. This triggering event led many US states to
contemporaneously consider regulating workplace smok-
ing. Different states proposed a variety of policies, and
each had different protocols for considering legislation,
ranging from legislative hearings to a task force soliciting
public comment. As a result, state legislation on this issue
offers a wide range of outcomes and participation levels
for comparison.
Our analysis of state legislative efforts to pass workplace
smoking restrictions builds on previous research consider-
ing state regulatory efforts to restrict smoking. Participa-
tion in regulatory hearings on workplace smoking has
been dominated by the tobacco industry, with little or no
participation by public health advocates [46-50] Histori-
cally, regulatory hearings, unlike legislative hearings, were
closed to the public[51,52] Relevant industry representa-
tives were invited to present testimony, however, and were
traditionally considered to be scientifically objective in
presenting evidence about potential regulation[53] Regu-
lators no longer believe that industry scientists are objec-
tive and recognize the vulnerability of regulatory hearings
to "Astroturf" lobbying – the phenomenon where an
interest group floods a hearing with form letters in sup-
port of its preferred position[54] However, legislative
hearings have different characteristics than regulatory
hearings, and these differences make legislative hearings
far more likely to draw broad-based participation[55] Leg-
islative hearings typically solicit spoken testimony ratherHealth Research Policy and Systems 2007, 5:12 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/5/1/12
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than, or in addition to, written testimony. State  legisla-
tures also frequently hold open rather than closed hear-
ings. The tradition of holding hearings that can be
attended by non-legislators, in combination with the
expectation that individuals will appear in person to give
testimony, may make legislative hearings less susceptible
to industry efforts to hijack public commentary.
Theory
We base our analysis on arguments proposed by
Schattschneider in The Semisovereign People (1960), taking
three hypotheses and applying them to the case of work-
place smoking legislation. First, Schattschneider suggested
that the scope of argument would expand if the group that
is losing an argument, or proposing to change the status
quo, can call in reinforcements, which he referred to as
"the crowd"[1] He wrote, "the outcome of every conflict is
determined by the extent to which the audience becomes
involved in it"[1] (emphasis in original). Because there is
a difference between the number of people who may be
affected by a political action and the number of people
who  participate, an outcome cannot be predicted in
advance by measuring the strength of one interest relative
to another. However, more participation should advance
the public interest, because the public is always the largest
group affected. By this argument, states that passed
stronger workplace smoking legislation should also have
had more outside participation in legislative debate.
Hypothesis 1. Stronger workplace smoking legislation
will be associated with more outside participation in leg-
islative debate.
Schattschneider also proposed that the patterns of debate
would predict policy outcomes. He believed that partici-
pants seeking to restrict the scope of conflict would
emphasize ideological arguments and procedural ques-
tions (for example, whether or not the government has
the right to regulate) rather than claims of fact, such as sci-
entific evidence[1] With workplace smoking restrictions,
public health advocates started from a position of relative
disadvantage given that there was little existing regulation
and the tobacco industry had traditionally cultivated state
government. Arguments that focused on non-scientific
ideological claims like whether or not government had
the right to regulate would advantage the tobacco indus-
try, because they are not objectively right or wrong. These
kinds of claims should be more appealing to industry in
part because they cannot be disproved. The tobacco
industry did in fact focus on these kinds of arguments in
its efforts to prevent workplace smoking regulation[46]
Our second hypothesis is that the use of ideological argu-
ments, relative to other kinds of arguments, is related to
the strength of legislation.
Hypothesis 2. Stronger workplace smoking legislation
will be associated with less focus on ideological argu-
ments.
In considering the scope of political debate, Schattschnei-
der also argued that ideological arguments come in two
forms: One type "privatizes" conflict and the other
"socializes" conflict[1] He noted that privatizing argu-
ments were typically ideological in nature, and claimed
that the issue in question should be outside the scope of
governmental action. Arguments that emphasize individ-
ualism or free enterprise suggest that outside forces, such
as economic self-interest, will serve in lieu of government
to accomplish the same policy goals,[1] or alternatively,
that the underlying values they represent are superior to
the goals of collective regulation. These types of argu-
ments are often associated with beliefs about the appro-
priate role of government, and lead actors to behave in
ways that might seem counter to their own personal inter-
ests. Individuals who have an ideological commitment to
the limited role of government may, for example, oppose
restrictions on smoking even though they themselves are
non-smokers and do not like to be around cigarette
smoke[56]
In contrast, Schattschneider noted that socializing argu-
ments suggest that the nature of the debate requires gov-
ernment to get involved, either because not doing so will
impose costs on society, or because the underlying values
they represent justify social regulation. These arguments
can include claims of threats to the public (in the case of
tobacco, public health), civil rights, justice, or claims of
equal protection[1] Socializing arguments are often asso-
ciated with beliefs about the appropriate role of govern-
ment. They assume that government should take action to
improve the lives of individuals. The predicted effects of
privatizing and socializing arguments, which largely
measure support and opposition to legislation across ide-
ological arguments, are summarized in our third and final
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. In the context of ideological arguments,
stronger workplace smoking legislation will be associated
with a greater share of socializing arguments, and a lesser
share of privatizing arguments.
Methods
This paper specifically considers the efforts of six different
American states to pass Clean Indoor Air Acts between
1992 and 2003. In 1992, the US EPA released a risk assess-
ment on the health effects of secondhand smoke called
The Respiratory Health Effects of Passive Smoking: Lung Can-
cer and Other Disorders[45] In this report, the EPA labeled
secondhand smoke a Class A carcinogen for the first time.
This evidence catalyzed several states to introduce andHealth Research Policy and Systems 2007, 5:12 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/5/1/12
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debate legislation that would restrict workplace smoking,
a major source of secondhand smoke exposure.
We searched the American Lung Association's database
"State Legislated Action on Tobacco Issues" and Lexis/
Nexis to identify states that adopted or amended legisla-
tion to restrict tobacco use in private workplaces, includ-
ing restaurants and bars. We also looked for states where
proposed legislation failed. After contacting the legislative
research offices of each state that passed legislation
between 1992 and 2002, we found records of legislative
proceedings were available for Florida, Louisiana, Ore-
gon, South Dakota, and Utah. To identify those states
where legislative attempts failed, we contacted the
tobacco control officers and each regional American Lung
Association office in the twenty-five states that by 2002
had no policy in place. (Contact information was gra-
ciously provided by Chris Bostic, Manager of Policy Anal-
ysis at the American Lung Association and Kristen
Tertzakian, Senior Analyst of Tobacco Control Policy at
the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials.)
Six states had failed bills that would have established a
statewide policy stronger than existing local restrictions,
but only North Dakota had maintained records of its leg-
islative proceedings. Although this set of states is incom-
plete, it includes a range of regions and types of
legislatures that suggest our results can be generalized to
the rest of the United States.
We collected all available legislative records for each of the
six states. The data included audiotapes of committee
hearings and floor debates that we transcribed verbatim,
all versions of each bill introduced (original, engrossed,
and enrolled), the text of any amendments offered during
the proceedings, any written testimony regarding the pro-
posed pieces of legislation, attendance and voting records,
and any legislative meeting minutes. For Florida, we
elected to include data from legislative proceedings dating
back to 1985, because legislative testimony from the
1990s frequently referenced issues raised in the earlier
debates. A year prior to the enactment of its first indoor air
restrictions, the Utah legislature appointed a taskforce to
study issues regarding environmental tobacco smoke and
to recommend state action regarding these issues. We col-
lected the audiotapes from each of the taskforce meetings
as well as letters submitted to the taskforce and included
them as data for the Utah case study.
We conducted a content analysis of all available oral and
written testimony for both legislators and non-legislative
participants. If both oral and written testimony were sub-
mitted by the same participant, the data providing the
most extensive arguments were selected for analysis. Each
document was coded for the participant's position on the
legislation, the affiliation of the participant, and the argu-
ments made. We developed coding categories for the argu-
ments inductively and in conjunction with previously
constructed coding instruments used in studies of regula-
tory proceedings [46-48] We defined the smallest text unit
as a sentence and each text unit could be coded for multi-
ple occurrences of an argument. Categories of argument
included science/health effects, economic, ideological,
and governmental/implementation, and some claims
were coded under more than one category. Multiple
researchers coded the documents with each coder respon-
sible for a different set of argument types. When all coding
had been completed, the full research team reviewed the
work as a quality control measure.
To rank the relative strength of each state's smoking
restrictions we applied a modified version of a rating sys-
tem of state clean indoor air laws developed by the
National Cancer Institute's State Cancer Legislative Data-
base Program[57] The rating system identifies state spe-
cific smoking restrictions in seven indoor settings and
scores them according to the extent to which such restric-
tions minimize exposure to secondhand smoke. It also
scores elements of the state laws that narrow or limit its
application, whether the law defines penalties and
enforcement, or if the law preempts those of lower juris-
dictions. We calculated scores for the extent of restrictions
in private workplaces, restaurants, and bars and scored for
any limitations or exemptions, penalties/enforcement,
and preemption, with a higher score representing more
public health protection, which we refer to as stronger leg-
islation.
Our expectations relate to outside participation in the leg-
islative process, so our results only review the testimony of
non-legislators. Our analysis relies primarily on the set of
codes designated as ideological arguments. We identified
the direction of ideological arguments as being either pri-
vatizing or socializing. Ideological arguments included
the kinds of statements that Schattschneider identified as
privatizing, such as "individualism, free private enterprise,
privacy"[1] and variants of these arguments that apply
only to the issue of smoking, such as smokers' rights and
courtesy to smokers. They also included claims Schattsch-
neider identified as socializing, such as "equal protection
of the laws, justice"[1] and variants of these arguments
that apply only to the issue of smoking, such as claims
about nonsmokers' rights, majority will, and the need to
protect worker health and the public health.
Results
We begin by summarizing the nature of legislation in each
state (see Table 1 for the specifics of each law), then review
the nature of arguments made in the six states. We con-
clude by testing the strength of Schattschneider's theoreti-
cal claims.Health Research Policy and Systems 2007, 5:12 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/5/1/12
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History of state legislation and outside participation
Each state that considered a statewide workplace smoking
law had a slightly different process, although all the states
held hearings and engaged in legislative debate. Some
state hearings drew testimony from national advocacy
groups or tobacco industry lobbyists. Participants dis-
cussed issues such as the importance of protecting public
health, whether a law was necessary or whether businesses
would self-regulate, the rights of smokers and nonsmok-
ers, the possible economic impact of a new law, and the
relevance of public opinion. The types of participation
and argument in each state are summarized in Table 2.
To a certain extent, these major points of discussion sug-
gest some of the broad cultural differences between these
states. The state of Utah is largely Mormon, and more will-
ing to legislate on social issues than many other states in
the western US. Like those states, however, the Utah state
government has typically been cautious about imposing
economic regulations. North Dakota and South Dakota,
which have similar state cultures, both proposed very
strong clean indoor air laws around the same time, but
only South Dakota's passed. Overall, if smoking legisla-
tion were associated with historical willingness to legislate
on economic and public health issues, we would have
expected Utah and Oregon to pass the strongest legisla-
tion, and the Dakotas to pass (or fail to pass) the weakest
legislation, but with the exception of Utah, this was not
the case. Unfortunately it is difficult to judge how these
cultural differences might motivate greater or lower
degrees of testimony; for example, many states in the
western US have legislatures that meet only every two
years, and the limited time that legislators are in session
could either motivate or discourage participation.
Types of ideological arguments
We classified the ideological arguments in each state as
privatizing or socializing. Examples of each type of argu-
ment are provided in Table 3. Privatizing arguments
focused on whether government involvement was appro-
priate or on the need to maintain status quo protections
of smokers. Free enterprise arguments emphasized the
right of individuals and businesses to make their own
decisions. In contrast, arguments about smoker's rights
made the claim that establishing non-smoking work-
places, or even non-smoking areas in public places, would
discriminate against smokers. Similarly, arguments about
courtesy to smokers claimed that further legislation would
unfairly impose on smokers. Overall, these kinds of ideo-
logical arguments took the question of workplace smok-
ing restrictions as one related to the rights of individuals
and the appropriate scope of government action.
In contrast, ideological arguments that were socializing in
nature either directly challenged the claim of individual
rights by asserting the rights of nonsmokers or called
upon government to respond to majority will and to pro-
tect the health of the public. The most common argument
was that state government has the responsibility to protect
the health of workers and the public. Overall, socializing
ideological arguments looked at new workplace smoking
restrictions as a way to protect public health, prove gov-
ernment responsiveness, and establish equal rights for
nonsmokers.
Table 1: Details of state legislation, 1992–2003
State Year Process Policy details
Utah 1994 Task force and legislative hearings Private worksites: Smokers and nonsmokers in separate areas
Restaurants: Smoking banned
Bars: No restrictions
South Dakota 2002 Legislative hearings Private worksites: Smoking banned
Restaurants: Smoking allowed where alcohol is served
Bars: No restrictions
Florida 1992 Legislative hearings Private worksites: Smokers and nonsmokers in separate areas
Restaurants: Requires separate areas if restaurant seats more than 50 people
Bars: No restrictions (Also preempts stronger local laws)
Oregon 2002 Legislative hearings Private worksites: Smokers and nonsmokers in separate areas
Restaurants: Requires separate areas if restaurant seats more than 30 people
Bars: No restrictions (Also preempts stronger local laws)
North Dakota 2003* Legislative hearings Private worksites: Would have banned smoking
Restaurants: Would have banned smoking
Bars: Proposed no restrictions
Louisiana 1993 Legislative hearings Private worksites: If nonsmokers object to smoking, employers should try to 
accommodate both smokers and nonsmokers
Restaurants and bars: No restrictions (Also preempts stronger local laws)
Source: Proposed and final legislation.
* North Dakota proposed but did not pass new workplace smoking restrictions.
Note: States ordered from strongest legislation to weakest legislation; North Dakota is ranked based on its existing lawHealth Research Policy and Systems 2007, 5:12 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/5/1/12
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Analysis of arguments
Our analysis compares the number of participants, the
share of ideological arguments as a percentage of all the
types of arguments coded (relative to scientific, economic,
and political claims), and the nature of ideological argu-
ments to the eventual strength of legislation passed in
each state.
Hypothesis 1: Stronger legislation associated with more 
participation
Schattschneider argued that the greater the participation
by outsiders, the more likely it should be that an outcome
reflects public will. Increased participation should be
unpopular with individuals and groups that benefit from
the status quo. Our review of workplace smoking legisla-
tion confirms this supposition. With one exception, our
descriptive data suggest that the more outsiders who par-
ticipated in a state's legislative process, the stronger the
eventual legislation (see Figure 1).
Outside participants in the states we considered repre-
sented a range of occupations, including business owners,
restaurant and bar workers, physicians, public health
advocates, tobacco industry lobbyists, consultants, and
legislative aides. Utah passed the strongest Clean Indoor
Air Act, and the number of individual non-legislators (65)
who participated in the process exceeded by a third that of
Florida, the state with the second highest number of par-
ticipants. In contrast, Louisiana, which passed the weakest
legislation, had only three outside participants involved
in the debate over a new clean indoor air law. Outside par-
ticipation in most of the other states fell between these
two extremes. Only Florida appears exceptional, with
many more non-legislators (42) participating than there
were in South Dakota (29), which eventually passed a
much stronger law. We believe that this discrepancy
reflects the fact that most states considered their work-
place smoking legislation over a two to three year period,
but Florida's debate spanned almost six years. Overall, the
association between the number of outside participants
and the strength of legislation is consistent with our
expectations. Although limited sample size makes it
impossible to test all alternative hypotheses, participation
in the legislative process appears to be related to legisla-
tive outcomes. Notably, despite  decreased public willing-
ness to tolerate secondhand smoke exposure over  the
course of this decade, both the strongest and weakest laws
were  introduced at the beginning and the end of the time
period we  considered, suggesting that this change in pub-
lic opinion may have  little weight unless it is expressed
directly to legislators.
Hypothesis 2: Stronger legislation associated with less 
ideological focus
We also considered the question of whether stronger
workplace smoking legislation was associated with less
Table 2: Summary of participation and issues discussed, by state (ordered from strongest to weakest legislation)
State Year initiated Outside participants Participant types Major issues discussed
Utah 1993 65 Local and national advocates, including 
former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop
Protecting public health; risks of 
secondhand smoke; economic impact of a 
new law; state reputation for excessive 
moralizing
South Dakota 2001 29 Local and national advocates, including 
lobbyists for Brown & Williamson and RJ 
Reynolds
Protecting public health; whether 
legislation was needed or businesses 
would self-regulate; personal experiences 
with smoking
Florida 1992 42 Local advocates and some national 
organizations
Protecting public health; whether 
legislation was needed or businesses 
would self-regulate; smoker and 
nonsmoker rights
Oregon 2001 28 Local advocates and some national 
organizations
Pre-emption clause (whether the state 
should prevent localities from passing 
more-restrictive laws); protecting public 
health; the views of state residents; 
potential negative economic impacts of a 
law
North Dakota 2001 12 Local advocates and constituents Whether government action was 
necessary or businesses would self-
regulate; personal experiences with 
smoking; limited discussion about 
protecting public health
Louisiana 1992 3 Tobacco industry lobbyist and legislative 
staffers
Importance of accommodating smokers; 
difficulty of enforcing smoking restrictions
Source: Transcribed testimony given for and against proposed and final legislation, coded by the authors.Health Research Policy and Systems 2007, 5:12 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/5/1/12
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emphasis on ideological arguments, relative to other
coded arguments. The relationship is less obvious, though
still apparent (see Figure 2). As expected, the percentage of
ideological arguments, as a percentage of all arguments,
was lowest in Utah (16%), which had the strongest legis-
lation. However it was highest in North Dakota (57%),
which had only the second weakest legislation (as noted,
this ranking refers to the existing law rather than the pro-
posed legislation). Moreover, the use of ideological argu-
ments is similar in South Dakota (27%), Florida (31%),
and Oregon (32%), even though the strength of their leg-
islation differs.
Louisiana is an obvious exception, reflecting the behavior
of one of the few participants in Louisiana's legislative
hearings: a tobacco industry lobbyist. She rewrote the bill
nearly single-handedly, and spent substantial time talking
about details such as enforcement measures (which were
nearly eliminated). She used ideological arguments only
when legislators questioned her about the justification for
changes (all of which favored the tobacco industry), and
her usual response was that it was "fair" to guarantee that
people could smoke in the workplace.
Overall, our evidence suggests that less focus on ideologi-
cal arguments is associated with stronger legislation,
though further research is needed. In our coding, a smaller
share of ideological arguments meant that there was more
focus on scientific, economic, or governmental argu-
ments. Except in Louisiana, using ideological arguments
appeared to be associated with weaker legislation. A
greater focus on non-ideological arguments was evident
in states that passed stronger legislation.
Hypothesis 3: Stronger legislation associated with more 
socializing arguments
Finally, we considered whether stronger workplace smok-
ing legislation was associated with the greater use of
socializing arguments and lesser use of privatizing argu-
ments. We found that Schattschneider's case was weakest
here, though our results may be confounded somewhat by
differences in state political culture or history that make
legislators more responsive to different types of argu-
ments[58] Although Louisiana, the state with the weakest
legislation, had by far the largest share of privatizing argu-
ments (100%), both Utah and South Dakota participants
used more privatizing arguments than participants in
North Dakota's legislative process. With the exception of
Louisiana, none of the states followed the hypothesized
Table 3: Examples of ideological arguments by type
Argument type Quote
Privatizing: Free enterprise "Leave the free enterprise system to go on its own. The market'll take care of it. We don't have 
to legislate. This body doesn't have one cent invested in any of these businesses. The state 
doesn't have a penny invested in the businesses. Who are we to tell these people how to run 
their businesses? But we're only telling a certain few how to run their businesses. Let the people 
run their own businesses."
"Our customers are adults, over twenty-one years old. Legislation should not decide this issue, 
the market should. Laissez-faire capitalism is the foundation of our market system. People will 
spend their money at the businesses that treat them right and cater to their needs."
Privatizing: Smoker's rights "If we're making restaurants, and presently you're all smoking, have a no-smoking section, we 
ought to make those that are presently non-smoking have at least a small section for smoking. It's 
fair and equal and fair. And we shouldn't be discriminating against smokers where we are in this 
bill."
Privatizing: Courtesy (fairness to smokers) "But, you have to say one thing about smokers as a group, they are paying more than their fair 
share of taxes. And by god when you're paying more than your fair share and we're already 
limiting them to where they can sit and everything else in restaurants. I think they have been 
punished enough."
Socializing: Equal protection (for nonsmokers) "If you want to smoke it just seems to me as if you should have the right to do so. But if I choose 
not to smoke I should have the right to not have to. I should have the right to not have to 
associate with Senator Landry if I don't want to, is the point that I'm making."
Socializing: Public opinion "Now if I was going to move ahead a little bit farther I might try to make an argument about that 
maybe we should take into consideration about what Oregonians actually think about this issue. 
Well, from a relatively recent poll, 82% of Oregonians say that people should be protected from 
second hand smoke."
Socializing: Protect public health "It would be our view that business has a responsibility to provide a healthy and safe work 
environment for employees and customers and that the right to do business in this state comes 
with responsibilities, responsibilities that this body imposes on business every day after weighing 
the costs and benefits to the citizens of this state. And I mean all the citizens of this state, not just 
those lucky enough to be business owners in the State of South Dakota."
Source: Transcribed testimony given for and against proposed and final legislation, coded by the authors.Health Research Policy and Systems 2007, 5:12 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/5/1/12
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pattern (see Figure 3). Our evidence does not support
Schattschneider's contention that the use of socializing
arguments is associated with outcomes that are more ori-
ented to collective goals.
Conclusion
Our research suggests two major conclusions. First, our
analysis of legislation on workplace smoking restrictions
validates Schattschneider's long-standing assertion about
the relationship between participation and political out-
comes. Increased participation in the legislative process
does appear to be related to legislative outcomes support-
ive of public health. Second, these findings suggest some
practical strategies that may be effective in future efforts to
pass public health legislation. Public health advocates
should make efforts to appear at legislative hearings and
give testimony, or to encourage legislators to hear a wide
range of views when considering new legislation by estab-
lishing task forces that explicitly solicit public opinion.
Existing research notes that health professionals are
widely viewed as persuasive by legislators, and that policy
makers would like more contact with them [59-61] More-
over, recent research on advocacy and lobbying before leg-
islatures suggests that tactics used in the United States may
also be applicable to efforts in other democracies[62,63]
Although Schattschneider's claims about bias in political
representation have been widely accepted for decades,
very little research attempts to test whether greater partic-
ipation is correlated with different political outcomes. In
part, this reflects the focus of political scientists on
national-level policy making and the emphasis of public
health researchers on case studies of individual countries,
laws, or states. In either type of study it is difficult to
observe multiple iterations of the same decision under
different circumstances at the same time. In contrast, our
review of state Clean Indoor Air Acts offered the opportu-
nity to consider legislation on a single issue in different
forums over the course of approximately a decade. These
data, however, suffer certain limitations. Because not all
states keep records of their legislative activities, it was only
possible to review the activities of a subset of legislatures,
which prevents us from controlling for factors such as dif-
ferences in population or political culture. In addition,
because states do not always consider legislation on the
same issues contemporaneously, our analysis is limited to
the passage of one kind of legislation, clean indoor air
laws. Finally, over the course of the decade we considered
public opinion about risks of exposure to secondhand
smoke changed substantially, although our findings do
not show increased policy strength over time. Nonethe-
less, the analysis is illustrative.
Future research that could review testimony over a larger
number of localities, states, or countries and a more lim-
Strength of legislation and percentage of arguments relating  to ideology in workplace smoking legislation testimony,  1992–2003 Figure 2
Strength of legislation and percentage of arguments 
relating to ideology in workplace smoking legislation 
testimony, 1992–2003. Source: Coding of committee 
hearings, floor debates, task force meetings, and letters 
introduced as testimony. Details of the coding described in 
the text. Note: Percentage of ideological arguments repre-
sents the number of passages coded as ideological over the 
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Outside participants in workplace smoking legislative hear- ings, 1992–2003 Figure 1
Outside participants in workplace smoking legislative 
hearings, 1992–2003. Source: Coding of committee hear-
ings, floor debates, task force meetings, and letters intro-
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ited time period would allow for additional controls that
would strengthen this finding. Although exogenous
events that trigger multiple policy changes across jurisdic-
tions are rare, they offer a unique opportunity for
researchers and advocates who wish to understand what
motivates policy change. In addition, additional research
on participation patterns in different states across a range
of issues and over time could shed light on the question
of whether certain state cultures or the presence of local
advocacy groups inspire citizens to testify more fre-
quently.
Schattschneider claimed that full participation would pro-
duce outcomes that served the public interest, and our
research provides support for this claim. However, it is
also possible that legislators who are already willing to
accept stronger public health legislation were also more
willing to hear more testimony, because they correctly
assessed that public opinion supported strong legislation.
In either case, our results offer guidance to public health
advocates. If greater participation leads to stronger legisla-
tion, then attendance at legislative hearings may increase
the likelihood of passing legislation that benefits public
health. If legislators who are willing to pass stronger legis-
lation are willing to hear a range of public comment, then
observing the rules and practices that legislators establish
when considering new legislation, specifically the degree
to which testimony is allowed and encouraged, can pre-
dict the likelihood of success. Even in the absence of rele-
vant legislation, our findings suggest that public health
advocates should also support proposals to encourage
open public hearings.
In keeping with evidence suggesting the importance of
issue framing,[18,64] the passage of stronger legislation
appeared to be associated with less focus on ideology, and
more focus on the substance of legislation. We conclude
that public health advocates may also be more successful
if they focus on public health concerns rather than being
drawn into ideological discussion, despite the suggestion
of some researchers than tobacco control advocacy focus
on claims of individual rights[65]
Although seeking to pass public health legislation (rather
than regulate or litigate) is particularly relevant in the case
of tobacco, where legislative changes are most effective in
modifying behavior,[66] the lessons drawn from tobacco
control policy changes can be applied to other public
health problems, such as obesity and alcohol consump-
tion[67] The specific actions our research suggests are
effective, such as attending public hearings, are relatively
low cost in comparison to other political activities such as
hiring lobbyists and making campaign contributions, and
these actions appear to be ultimately more effective in
establishing public health legislation[38,68]
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